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Professor Davis taught English at Pomona College. His work
may have been little known except to his students and a limited
number of scholars, but his embroilment in an income tax controversy '
involving only $683.50 became the cause of his profession.2 For him
the case resulted in victory.' The extent and finality of the victory for
his profession, however, remain to be seen.
Davis joined-the English Department at Pomona in 1927, becom-
ing a full professor in 1944 with tenure secured earlier. His special
interest lay in the English Renaissance. In the summer of 1956 he
went to England to complete a research project leading toward the
publication of A Critical Census of Translators and Translations into
English from 1475 to 1640. The primary source materials needed
to complete his self-appointed task were available only in England: at
the British Museum, the Bodleian Library at Oxford, and the Library
of Lambeth Palace.
The research and travel took six weeks. Davis' expenses (air
fare, meals, and lodging) amounted to $2,116.19, and he deducted
them on his 1956 income tax return although he had no expectation of
profit from the sale of the book. He claimed the expenses under
j- Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1946; LL.B. 1948, Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania. Member, Pennsylvania Bar.
1 Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962).
2 See note 6 infra and accompanying text.
3 Ibid.
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section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code as the "ordinary and
necessary" expenses of carrying on business which, for him, included
advancing the knowledge of English Renaissance literature.
The Commissioner disallowed the deduction and the Tax Court
sustained him because Davis, a salaried individual, had not been re-
quired by his employer, Pomona, to write the book or make the trip.'
Since he had tenure,5 he could not have been discharged for not
pursuing his research. His expenses, the court concluded, were there-
fore not "necessary." The dissent supported the deduction on the
ground that the statutory requirement of a "necessary" expense is met
when it bears a direct relationship to the taxpayer's work and is helpful
and appropriate to its performance."
The Davis case was resolved when, on appeal to the Ninth
Circuit, the Commissioner joined in a stipulation to vacate and remand
the case to the Tax Court for entry of a decision of "no deficiency." '
About the same time, the Commissioner issued Revenue Ruling
63-275 8 holding deductible the expenses of a professor engaged in
research in an area of his professional competence whether or not
he has tenure.'
4 Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175, 177 (1962).
5 The concept, purpose, and function of tenure are discussed in notes 80-83 infra
and accompanying text.
6 Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175, 180 (1962).
7 The stipulation called for remand to the Tax Court for entry of decision pursuant
to the "agreement of the parties." That "agreement," set forth in a Department of
Justice letter to taxpayer's counsel, called for a stipulation of "no deficiency" to be
filed with the Tax Court. Such a stipulation was filed with the Tax Court and decision
entered in accordance therewith. Harold H. Davis, No. 85651, T.C., March 5, 1964.
For the Ninth Circuit's order of remand, see Davis v. Commissioner, No. 18188, 9th
Cir., Jan. 3, 1964.
As indicated in the text accompanying note 2 supra, the Tax Court's initial
decision in Davis created widespread concern in the academic community. The appeal
to the Ninth Circuit was financed by the American Association of University Pro-
fessors and amicus curiae briefs were filed by that association, the American Asso-
ciation of Land Grant Colleges and State Universities, and the Walters Art Gallery.
The Association of American Law Schools indicated to the court its accord with the
brief filed by the American Association of University Professors. See Oliver, The
Deductibility of Expenses: A Professor's Research and a Study in His Home, 50
AsmucAqr A. UNvmsr PROFESsoRS BuLL. 14 (1964).
8 1963 INT. REv. BuLL. No. 52, at 13. The ruling was issued following a formal
conference and subsequent informal communication between the Commissioner, his staff,
officials of the Justice Department and counsel representing Davis, the amici curiae,
and others in the field of education. Agreement to issue the ruling made possible the
amicable disposition of the Davis appeal. The Department of Justice filed no appellate
brief in Davis, having received repeated extensions of time pending the Commissioner's
decision whether to issue the ruling. See Oliver, mspra note 7, at 15.
9 The coming of Revenue Ruling 63-275 was heralded by Technical Information
Release 525 (Dec. 9, 1963) [hereinafter Technical Information Releases cited as
T.I.R.]. The Release, setting forth the proposed ruling in extenso, did not indicate
the significance of tenure. To eliminate any doubt that tenure is irrelevant to the
issue of deductibility, the phrase "with or without tenure" was included in the ruling
as published in the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
The ruling is based on the fact that the duties of a professor, whether or not
he has tenure, include "communication and advancement of knowledge through research
PROFESSORS AND THE BUSINESS EXPENSE
The narrow question posed by the Tax Court in Davis-whether
a professor's research expenses could be "necessary" if not required
of him by his college or university '--suggests a serious misconception
of both the income tax statute and the business of a professor. In
exploring the administrative and judicial history which spawned the
Davis controversy and resolved it, this Article will suggest an analysis
which may support a narrow circumscription of some of the areas of
future dispute.1
I. THE STATUTORY FORMULATION
The Code moves from gross toward net income by allowing a
current deduction for the "ordinary and necessary" operating ex-
penses of a business.' Nonoperating expenditures, those which result
in the acquisition of a business asset having an extended but deter-
minable useful life, are characterized as "capital" and are deductible
through annual depreciation charges over the asset's productive life.' 3
and publication" as well as teaching. Deductibility of a professor's research expenses,
including allocable travelling expenses, "incurred . . . for the purpose of teaching,
lecturing, or writing and publishing in his area of competence" is thus based on a
recognition that they are the ordinary and necessary business expenses of one carrying
out the duties "expected of . . . a professor" although he has no "expectation of
profit apart from salary." Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963 INT. R v. BuLL. No. 52, at 13.
A cautionary note in the ruling indicates that certain research expenditures may
have to be capitalized, presumably a reference to research which is likely to lead to
a saleable asset such as a commercially marketable book. It may also refer to assets
purchased which will have value in the professor's research over several years (e.g.,
books and typewriters). See also G.C.M. 11654, X-2 Cum. BuLL. 130 (1931),; note
27 infra. Acknowledgment that scholarly research does not usually lead to "a spe-
cific income-producing asset" dispels any notion that such research may itself be a
capital asset or that the research expenses incurred, particularly for intangibles and
short-lived tangibles, are to be capitalized. This acknowledgment makes less impor-
tant a test of the validity of the Commissioner's interpretation of INT. R-V. CODE op
1954, § 174 (election to deduct currently or to amortize over sixty months research
expenses of a capital nature) [hereinafter all sections cited refer to INT. REv. CODE:
OF 1954 unless otherwise indicated]. Without apparent basis in the statute or legislative
history, he holds in Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a) (1) (1957) that the section is inapplicable
to "literary, historical, or similar projects."
10 A subsidiary issue in the Davis case is discussed in note 76 infra.
11 For a recent discussion of the tax problems of professors in special context,
see Zucker, Income and Expenses of Visiting and Traveling Professors, 18 TAx L.
Rav. 379 (1963). See also, Oliver, Sabbatical Leave Travel Expenses and the Federal
Income Tax, 43 AmmCAN A. UNIVSrrY PROFEssORs BULL. 507 (1957). See gen-
erally, Loring, Some Tax Problems of Students and Scholars, 45 CALn. L. Ra. 153,
153-57 (1957).
12 Section 162(a) allows "all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business . . . ." The language
of § 23(a) (1) of the 1939 Code was the same. Many of the cases to be discussed
arose under the 1939 Code, but for the sake of simplicity all code references will be
to § 162(a) of the 1954 Code. The Article will refer to "net" income to indicate the
gross income less the allowable deductions on which tax is computed because it
expresses the economic concept in a more familiar and perhaps meaningful way than
does "taxable" income, substituted by the 1954 Code for the term "net" which had
been used previously.
.3 Section 263(a) (1) denies any deduction "for new buildings or for permanent
improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate."
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Expenditures unrelated to the taxpayer's "trade or business" are
nondeductible and characterized as "personal." 11
The issues which understandably arise in this statutory framework
are (1) whether a taxpayer's expenditures are so concerned with
consumption that they may not be treated as business expenditures,
but must be disallowed as "personal," and (2) whether business
expenditures are "current" and therefore currently deductible, or
"capital" and therefore deductible, if at all, only through annual de-
preciation or amortization charges over the life of the acquired asset.
The statutory language has also lent itself to the articulation of a
third issue: whether a current expenditure, though business-related,
is nevertheless nondeductible because not "ordinary and necessary." '5
Subsection (2) disallows expenditures for "restoring property or in making good the
exhaustion thereof for which an allowance is or has been made." Subsection (1)
derives from the Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, § 117, 13 Stat 281, and was probably
intended originally to distinguish the building "repair" from the "improvement"
Although the rule that capital expenditures are not currently deductible would exist
without any express statutory provision therefor, § 263(a) is construable to support
application of the rule as to any kind of "improvement." See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.263 (a) -1,
1.263 (a)-2 (1958).
Section 167(a) allows depreciation on "property used in the trade or business"
or "held for the production of income." But see notes 16-17 infra and accompanying
text.
14 Section 262 denies any deduction for "personal, living or family expenses."
Like § 263 (a) (1), this section is probably unnecessary. See note 13 supra.
15 The word "ordinary" was first used in a federal income statute to modify a
deductible item, "repairs," in § 117 of the Revenue Act of 1864, ch. 173, 13 Stat. 281.
Legislative history indicates no specific significance to be ascribed it. This modifier
was reenacted by Joint Resolution No. 18 of Feb. 21, 1895, 28 Stat. 971, amending
the Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, § 28, 28 Stat. 553. The 1894 Act also allowed "the
necessary expenses . . . in carrying on any business . . . '"-the first time "neces-
sary" appears in a federal income tax statute to modify a deductible item. Although
no significant legislative history can be found for this innovation, a correlative sec-
tion in the corporate portion of the Revenue Act of 1894, ch. 349, 28 Stat. 509, allow-
ing a deduction for "actual operating and business expenses," evoked concern from
several Senators who felt that the words "are made to carry too heavy a burden,"
26 CONG. REc. 7133 (1894) (remarks of Senator Chandler), and would not include
such expenses as cost of goods used or sold and insurance premiums. See 26 CONG.
REc. 6887, 7131, 7133 (1894). However, Senator Vest, in charge of the bill on the
Senate floor, felt that the language would be construed broadly and would, at least,
include the expenses raised by the other Senators. See id. at 7133.
The combined phrase "ordinary and necessary" first appeared in the corporation
income tax of 1909, Tariff Act of 1909, ch. 6, § 38, 36 Stat. 113, providing for the
determination of "net income" after allowance of "all the ordinary and necessary
expenses." Again, there is no legislative history for the phrase.
The Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § IIG(b), 38 Stat. 172, allowed a corporation
"all the ordinary and necessary expenses . . . in the maintenance and operation of
its business" in determining its net income, but for noncorporate taxpayers, "the
necessary expenses . . . in carrying on any business." §IIB, 38 Stat. 167. The
committee reports and debates shed no light on any special meaning to be accorded
these phrases. See S. REP. No. 80, 63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913) ; H.R. REP. No. 5,
63d Cong., 1st Sess. (1913). See also 50 CONG. REc. 421, 506, 5679 (1913).
In 1919 the 65th Congress rewrote the sections to read as they do today, allowing
the "ordinary and necessary" expenses of "carrying on" a business. 40 Stat. 1066,
1077 (1919). The only help that can be derived from the Committee Report, H.R.
REi. No. 767, 65th Cong., 3d Sess. (1918), is in the lack of any suggestion that these
words were meant to effect a substantive change.
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It is doubtful that this issue has a substantial claim to recognition
independent of the other two; indeed, the third issue may not have
been an inevitable aspect of the statutory scheme. It is these three
issues, however, often unclearly fused by the courts and Commissioner,
and particularly the third, that form the nucleus of this discussion.
Another issue which arises in this statutory context, one which is
for the most part beyond the scope of this Article, concerns expendi-
tures which result in the acquisition of an intangible capital asset (for
example, professional education) whose useful life has not been thought
estimable by customary measures. Because of this presumed difficulty
in estimating useful life, the law has not provided for the recovery
of those costs through the annual depreciation or amortization charge. 6
The result is controversy in which the taxpayer feels an extraordinary
pressure to establish that his expenditures for intangibles are not
capital, but current. However, the revenue agent who can support a
finding that the expenditures are capital and not recoverable by annual
charges has won a substantial victory in terms of the values inspired
by the adversary system in which the income tax is administered."
Although this "victory" in the case of an intangible asset of in-
determinable life has meant disallowance of the expenditures as a
current deduction, the courts and Commissioner have often failed to
specify its capital nature as the ground for disallowance, confusing it
with a "personal" asset. This failure underlies much of the history
which led to the Davis case.
II. EARLY HISTORY
A. To 1933
The Commissioner first published his position on the deducti-
bility of a professor's research expenses in 1922, holding in I.T. 1520
Mildly put, the statutory language "has induced a considerable amount of fuzzy
and circuitous judicial thinking." 1 RA~IIN & JoHNsoN, FEDERAL INcOME, Girt AND
EsTATE TAxAT ON § 3.02(4), at 312 (1964).
See also Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940) ; note 97 infra. See generally
Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be Narrowly
Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. Rxv. 1142, 1145-46 (1943).
16Treas. Reg. § 1.167 (a) (3) (1956). But cf. § 248 (corporate organizational
expenditures), § 174 (research and experimental expenditures, see note 9 supra), § 177
(trademark and tradename expenditures), § 615 (exploration expenditures). See
generally notes 66, 92 infra.
17 Where the usefulness of a business asset is likely to decline or dissipate over
a period of time, the law's failure to provide a fair and workable method of cost
recovery against recurrent income is a serious deficiency, one to which writers and
policymakers should direct some attention. See notes 43, 66, 92 infra.
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that a salaried college teacher who, with his colleagues, was "urged"
by his college to engage in research, could not deduct his research ex-
penditures.18 Noting that the taxpayer's research was "necessary from
the point of professional recognition and standing," but that it did
"not affect . . . salaries . . ." or produce other income, the Com-
missioner ruled the expenses "personal" and therefore nondeductible. 9
A year later, however, the Reverend Shutter, a Univeralist minister
from Minneapolis, attended his church's biannual convention in
Providence, and the Board of Tax Appeals directed that his travel
expenses be allowed because Reverend Shutter's "attendance at [the]
convention was essential to his standing and position in the church
, 20
Although I.T. 1520 viewed "professional recognition and stand-
ing" as indicia of a "personal" expense in the case of a college teacher,
"standing and position" were the keys to deduction for the minister
before the Board of Tax Appeals."'
Later, in Alexander Silvernan," the Board relied on Shutter to
allow a chemistry professor to deduct expenses incurred in attending
meetings of his professional societies. It regarded the expenditures
as "ordinary and necessary" business expenses because the professor
was "expected . . . to keep abreast in his particular field of work,"
and attendance at meetings was "expected and necessary [for this
purpose] and . . . to advance the interests of the university, though
his contract of employment [did] not specifically make mention of any
such activities . . ... 23
181-2 Cum. BuLL. 145 (1922).
19 The ruling also denied deductions for depreciation on the taxpayer's books and
instruments used in his research work and for expenses incurred in traveling to meet-
ings of scientific societies. The "personal" label was ascribed to all of the items,
presumably because no income was traceable to them.
In 1921 the Commissioner had ruled that "amounts expended by a physician for
railroad and pullman fares and hotel bills in attending a medical convention were not
ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in the pursuit of his profession and did not
constitute allowable deductions in his return." I.T. 1369, 1-1 Cum. BuLr. 123 (1921).
At this point, at least, the employed and self-employed were treated alike.
20 Marion D. Shutter, 2 B.T.A. 23 (1925).
21 In Shutter, supra note 20, the Board made no reference to either I.T. 1520,
see text accompanying note 18 supra, or to I.T. 1369, 1-1 Cum. BULL. 123 (1921),
note 19 supra, nor did it address itself to the "ordinary and necessary" phrase.
"Standing and position," resulting in a deduction in Shutter and their substantial
equivalent resulting in disallowance in I.T. 1520, were years later to be viewed again
as the damning indicators of a personal expenditure or perhaps a capital one. See
note 30 infra.
226 B.T.A. 1328, acq., VI-2 Cum. BULL. 6 (1927). The decision is contra to
I.T. 1520. See text accompanying note 18 supra. For revocation of I.T. 1520, see
note 25 infra.
23Alexander Silverman, mipra note 22, at 1328-29.
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After a series of similar defeats,' the Commissioner revoked
I.T. 1520 and ruled in G.C.M. 116542 that expenditures incurred in
publishing research results were not "personal," and that the current
deductibility of research expenditures depended "upon whether such
expenses are ordinary and necessary or . . . capital expenditures." 6
He thus appeared to recognize that research expenditures incurred in
the performance of one's work are business expenses (nonpersonal)
although not traceable or directed to the realization of specific income;
and he read the "ordinary and necessary" phrase as meaning only
"noncapital." "
B. Welch v. Helvering
If the Commissioner had followed the principles underlying
G.C.M. 11654, the scope of future controversy would have been
narrow indeed. In 1933, however, the year the G.C.M. was issued,
the Supreme Court decided Welch v. Helvering,.s holding with the
Commissioner that payments made by a commission agent to the
2 4
In Cecil M. Jack, 13 B.T.A. 726 (1928), acq., VIII-1 Cum. BULL. 22 (1929),
and J. Bentley Squier, 13 B.T.A. 1223 (1928), acq., VIII-1 Cum. BULL. 43 (1929),
the Board overturned the Commissioner's refusal to allow a physician the cost of
attending medical meetings; in Squier, supra, where the taxpayer was both a pro-
fessor and a practicing physician, the Board permitted a deduction for repairs to the
portion of the taxpayer's residence used exclusively for professional purposes. Cf.
note 76 infra. See also Robert C. Coffey, 21 B.T.A. 1242 (1931), acq., X-2 Cum.
BULL. 14 (1931) (physician's expenses in attending medical conventions to deliver
paper deductible as "ordinary and necessary business expenses") where the Board
relied on Silverman, supra note 22 (the employed chemistry professor), and Jack,
supra (the self-employed physician).
25XlI-1 Cum. BULL. 250 (1933). Revocation of I.T. 1520 was called for by
G.C.M. 11654, and occurred in I.T. 2688, XII-1 Cum. BULL. 250 (1933). I.T. 1369,
I-I Cum. BULL. 123 (1921), note 19 mupra, had been revoked by I.T. 2602, X-2 Cum.
BULL. 130 (1931), ruling deductible the expenses of a member of an association of
business concerns in sending a representative to attend the group's annual convention if
the "sole purpose [was to further] ...the business interest of such member." Cf. Rev.
Rul. 59-316, 1959-2 Cum. BULL. 57; Rev. Rul. 63-266, 1963 INT. REv. BULL. No. 51,
at 9 (current administrative position on deductibility of convention expenses of a
"delegate").
26 G.C.M. 11654, XII-1 Cum. BULL. 250 (1933). As to problems in the recovery
of intangible capital costs, see note 17 supra; notes 43, 66, 92 infra.
27G.C.M. 11654, XII-1 Cum. BULL. 250 (1933), removes from the "personal"
category where they had been placed by I.T. 1520, 1-2 Cum. BULL. 145 (1922), (1)
expenses of publishing research results, "such as plates and figures for illustrative
purposes, (2) depreciation on books and instruments purchased for use in research
work, and (3) expenses incurred when traveling [to] . . .meetings of scientific
societies . . . . G.C.M. 11654, XII-1 Cum. BULL. 250, 251 (1933). Items (2)
and (3) were ruled "deductible from gross income"; item (1) "may or may not be
deductible, depending upon whether such expenses are ordinary and necessary or con-
stitute capital expenditures." Ibid. See also I.T. 3448, 1941-1 Cum. BULL. 206,
ruling deductible (1) dues paid by teachers to their professional organizations, (2)
subscription cost of educational journals connected with the profession, and (3) travel
expenses (including meals and lodging) of attending teachers' conventions in this
country; the cost of technical books was held to be capital and recoverable only
through depreciation. As to capitalization under Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963 INT. REv.
BULL. No. 52, at 13, see note 9 supra.
28 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
1964]
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creditors of his bankrupt corporation after discharge were not de-
ductible.29 Since the taxpayer had made the payments "to re-
establish his relations with customers . . . and to solidify his credit
and standing [they] were not . . . ordinary and necessary expenses,
but were.rather in the nature of capital expenditures, an outlay for
the development of reputation and good will." " Speaking for a
unanimous Court, Mr. Justice Cardozo did not dispute that the
payments were "necessary for the development of the [taxpayer's]
. . . business, at least in the sense that they were appropriate and
helpful . . . ," but cautioned that "the problem is not solved when
the payments are characterized as necessary. Many necessary pay-
ments are charges upon capital." 1
For Justice Cardozo the word "ordinary" posed the question
whether the expenditure was capital or current. Expenditures rea-
sonably common to the operation of a business are, he said, "ordi-
nary"; expenditures to acquire "the only tools with which to hew a
pathway to success," like "reputation," "learning," and "goodwill,"
are "akin to capital assets," and the "money expended in acquiring
them . . . is not an ordinary expense of the operation of a business." 2
Although the opinion in Welch v. Helvering struggles with the
concept of "ordinary" as polar to "unique," noting that "there must
always be a strain of constancy" with the "instance . . . not erratic,
but . . . brought within a known type," " the essence of the analysis
is in its attempt to isolate the capital expenditure from the current. The
customariness of an expenditure was viewed as an index of the "ordi-
nary," but Justice Cardozo did not suggest that if an expense were
not "ordinary," it was "personal." " The Commissioner and the Tax
29 See also Friedman v. Delaney, 171 F.2d 269 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 936 (1949) (lawyer's payment to creditors of bankrupt client disallowed).
30 "Standing," treated as an element of. a capital asset in Welch v. Helvering,
290 U.S. 111, 112-13 (1933), contributed to deductibility in Marion D. Shutter, 2
B.T.A. 23 (1925), but had been ruled "personal" in I.T. 1520, 1-2 Cumn. BuLL. 145
(1922). See note 21 mrpra.
31290 U.S. at 113.
:32 Id. at 115-16.
331d. at 113-14.
34 If expenses are incurred in a business context, the effect of a finding that they
are not ordinary should be to treat them as capital. But if expenses are incurred in a
not-so-clearly business context, with heavy overtones of consumption, the customariness
of the expenses for others in carrying on their business activities may be a helpful
criterion in deciding whether the expenses are "business" or "personal." Customari-
ness thus becomes a factfinder's measure, helping to assay the taxpayer's credibility
and the proof offered. In Justice Cardozo's view of "customary" as an index of the
"ordinary," however, it is helpful if taken to mean ongoing or recurrent, but even
then not as the sine qua non of the operating expense as opposed to the capital, since
there may be one-shot, nonrecurrent expenditures which do not produce long-lived
assets and should therefore be written off currently. Cf. Deputy v. du Pont, 308 U.S.
488 (1940).
PROFESSORS AND THE BUSINESS EXPENSE
Court, however, inferred other meaning from the opinion, and this
was to become apparent in their treatment of educational expenses.
III. EDUCATIONAL EXPENSES
When the Commissioner revoked his early ruling that a college
teacher's research expenses were "personal," " he did not disturb O.D.
892, a 1921 ruling that expenses incurred by school teachers in attend-
ing summer school were not deductible because they were "in the
nature of personal expenses incurred in advancing their education
. . ," $ This unreasoned ruling became the basis for three decades
of an unbending administrative policy which disallowed all educational
expenses, brooking no distinctions.
A. The Hill Case
In 1949 the Tax Court, in deciding Nora Payne Hill,7 placed its
imprimatur on O.D. 892. In that case a public school teacher was re-
quired by the State of Virginia, as a condition of maintaining her
teaching certificate, either to pass an examination on selected books
or to perform satisfactorily in a university summer school program.
She chose the summer school alternative, and the Tax Court sustained
the disallowance of her school expenses. Referring to O.D. 892
while paying lip service to Welch v. Helvering,8 the court stressed
that only "ordinary" expenses are deductible; that an expense is not
ordinary unless it is of a "common" or "frequently occurring" type;
and that it would not "assume that public school teachers ordinarily
attend summer school to renew their certificates when alternative
methods are available." " Finding that the expenses were not "ordi-
nary," the Tax Court called them "personal" despite Justice Cardozo's
characterization of the nonordinary as capital.4' If the Tax Court
had disallowed the expense as capital, and not personal, the result for
the taxpayer would have been the same, but education would have
been recognized as at least sometimes having a business nexus. Such
35 See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
384 CuM. BuLL. 209 (1921). See also O.D. 984, 5 CuM. BuLL. 171 (1921)
(providing that "expenses incurred in taking postgraduate courses are deemed to
be in the nature of personal expenses and not deductible!).
3713 T.C. 291 (1949).
38290 U.S. 111 (1933). The Tax Court purported to rely also on Deputy v.
du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 494-96 (1940).
39 13 T.C. 291, 294 (1949).
40Earlier, in T. F. Driscoll, 4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926), the Board of Tax Appeals
characterized expenses incurred for instruction in voice by one anticipating vocal
engagements as "personal" and therefore nondeductible, but made no reference to
O.D. 892, 4 CuM. BuLL. 209 (1921). Cf. Marshall, 14 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 955
(1955) (cost of piano lessons held "educational and personal" for a businessman).
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recognition would have avoided language in the opinion on which the
Tax Court and Commissioner seemed later to rely when noncapital
research expenses, classified loosely as "education," were disallowed
as personal. As it happened, the Tax Court's "personal" char-
acterization for education in Hill survived even the reversal of that
decision.
In reversing Hill 4 the Fourth Circuit rejected the view that
the expenses were "personal," that they were not incurred in connection
with the taxpayer's business. Although the taxpayer had failed to
prove that school teachers ordinarily go to summer school, a fatal
failure before the Tax Court and Commissioner, the Fourth Circuit
held that the state's inclusion of summer school attendance as an ap-
propriate means of meeting its requirements provided adequate busi-
ness nexus to justify the deduction. For this court, if a "particular
course adopted by the taxpayer is a response that a reasonable person
would normally and naturally make under the specific circumstances," 4'
it is sufficient. But if education were undertaken to secure promotion
or a new position, the expense might not be "ordinary"-it could be
capital; the court therefore declined to state flatly that a teacher's
summer school expenses are ipso facto deductible. But because in
Hill the expense was incurred "in carrying on" the taxpayer's business,
and not for the purpose of establishing a business or moving into a
new position, the expenses were ordinary, not capital, and clearly not
"personal." 43 And so for the first time an educational expense was
held deductible.
41 Hill v. Commissioner, 181 F.2d 906 (4th Cir. 1950).
4 2 1d. at 908.
43 For the Tax Court in Hill, "customariness" went to "ordinariness"; failing
to find this, the court held the expense was not capital, but "personal." The business
context was established for the Fourth Circuit by the state requirement. In light of
that requirement, although summer school was stated as an alternative, it is doubtful
that "customariness" could add anything of probative value, and clear that its absence
should not be conclusive. See note 34 supra. See also J. S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014
(1959).
On the heels of the Fourth Circuit's reversal in Hill, the Tax Court decided
Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956, 958 (1950), denying a deduction to an employed
mechanic for the cost of evening engineering courses leading to a bachelor's degree
in administrative engineering. The education resulted in employment as an industrial
engineer and in higher pay. Citing O.D. 892, 4 Cum. Buu.. 209 (1921), O.D. 984,
5 Cumr. BULL. 171 (1921), Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), T. F. Driscoll,
4 B.T.A. 1008 (1926), and Hill, the court declined to identify its basis for disallow-
ance ("personal" or "capital") since "the result would be identical." Knut F. Larson,
supra at 958. In United States v. Patrick, 372 U.S. 53 (1963), legal fees connected
with a property settlement growing out of a divorce were disallowed as "personal,"
the court not reaching the Government's alternative contention that they were "capital"
because "it makes no difference for present purposes whether they are personal ex-
penses or capital expenditures; in either case they would not be deductible." Id. at
57; see United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39, 52 (1963); notes 16-17 supra and
accompanying text; text accompanying note 40 supra; notes 66, 92 infra.
PROFESSORS AND THE BUSINESS EXPENSE
B. Post-Hill Administration
After the appellate decision in Hill, the Commissioner modified
O.D. 892, agreeing in I.T. 4044 " that
summer school expenses incurred by a teacher for the purpose
of maintaining her position are deductible . . . as ordinary
and necessary business expenses, but [asserting that] ex-
penses incurred for the purpose of obtaining a teaching
position, or qualifying for permanent status, a higher posi-
tion, an advance in the salary schedule, or to fulfill the general
cultural aspirations of the teacher, are . . . persoial ex-
penses . . ..
This ruling could have been the occasion for the Commissioner to
distinguish the current business expense from the capital, and both of
them from the personal, but he chose instead to lump the capital 4
indiscriminately with the personal " and to call them all "personal."
Thus, a new groundwork of confusion was laid for more controversy
and, indeed, injustice."
C. The Cardoso Case
Professor Manoel Cardozo had been on the faculty of the
Catholic University of America for a number of years, first as
assistant professor of history and romance languages and then as
associate professor. During the summer of 1947 he went to Europe
at his own expense for research and study. The Commissioner dis-
allowed the trip expenses and the Tax Court sustained him shortly
after I.T. 4044 was issued.49 Paraphrasing the taxpayer's testimony,
the court found that "the purpose of his trip was to increase his
prestige, improve his reputation for scholarship and learning, and to
better fit him to perform the duties for which he was employed and
which he was performing at the university." " But since the court
also found that the university had not required the professor to make
41951-1 Cum. BuLL. 16.
45I.T. 4044, 1951-1 Cum. BULL. 16, 17. (Emphasis added.)
46 E.g., "obtaining a teaching position, or qualifying for permanent status . .. .
Ibid.
4 7 E.g., fulfilling "general cultural aspirations." Ibid.
48 See Knut F. Larson, 15 T.C. 956 (1950), where the Tax Court said it was
unimportant to distinguish between "capital" and "personal." See also text accom-
panying note 40 supra; notes 66, 92 infra.
49 Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951).
0O Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3, 6 (1951).
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the trip, it held the trip was not "necessary," and disallowed the
expenses as "personal." 51
An examination of the sparse record in Cardozo leaves much to
be desired. The precise relationship between the taxpayer's work and
the trip is not made clear, and the court's opinion would be under-
standable if the disallowance had been sustained for that reason. It
rests, however, on the absence of a strict, employer-created necessity
to make the trip. Evidence that the university gave favorable con-
sideration in its promotion policy to "publications [which] shall have
made noteworthy contributions to the advancement of knowledge
, . was thought immaterial "to the necessity of [the] .
trip in the taxable year, since it obviously deals with future promotion
and advancement." rs
The court saw its support for a rule of strict, employer-created
compulsion in Hill, both in its own decision and the Fourth Circuit's,
reading that case to permit deductibility only where an expenditure
was a prerequisite to the taxpayer's maintenance of his current position.
It denied any inference from the appellate opinion which would allow
a deduction for a voluntary expense, though incurred only to maintain
position and not to advance.
If the court in Cardozo had bottomed its decision on the tax-
payer's failure to prove a direct connection between his work and the
trip, the case might have been forgotten. If the court had held that
the expenditures were capital because the taxpayer was concerned
primarily with advancement of position and promotion, the case would
be seen only as an extreme application of the dictum of Welch v.
Helvering."4 The errors of significance in the case lay, however, in
(1) the court's assumption that a decision as to educational expenses
51 Ibid. But cf. Rev. Rul. 64-176, 1964 INT. REv. BULL. No. 23, at 7, 10, allowing
travel expenses of teacher on sabbatical where "travel had a direct relationship to
the skills required in his teaching position and was expected to result in . .. benefit
to him as a teacher holding such position," revoking Rev. Rul. 55-412, 1955-1 Cum.
Buu.. 318, and modifying I.T. 3380, 1940-1 Cum. BULL. 29.
52 Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3, 6 (1951).
n Ibid.
54290 U.S. 111 (1933). In James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944), the expenses
incurred by an unpaid research professor at Yale "for services incident to the prepa-
ration and publication of scholarly and literary matter" were disallowed because there
was no expectation of profit from the publications and his objective was to gain
from these the recognition which would help him secure a remunerative professional
appointment or a position as a college president. Since he received no compensation
for his work on the Yale faculty, the decision is justifiable on the ground that "the
expenses . . . are in essence the cost of capital structure from which his future
income is to be derived. They are not the ordinary and necessary expenses of carry-
ing on a trade or business." James M. Osborn, supra at 605. Unlike Professors
Cardozo and Davis, Osborn does not appear to have been in business, but was making
an investment for future professional opportunity. See note 86 infra; cf. Brooks v.
Commissioner, 274 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 16 CCII Tax
Ct. Mem. 1081 (1957).
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(Hill) necessarily governed expenses related, at least in part, to re-
search which was a part of the taxpayer's ongoing work as a pro-
fessor; ', (2) the derivation from Hill of a rule of strict necessity, and
this despite the fact that Hill relied on Welch v. Helvering in which
Justice Cardozo noted that generally an expense was "necessary" if in
the taxpayer's judgment it was helpful to the performance of his
work; rG and (3) the conclusion that a voluntary expense was "per-
sonal" if concerned with advancement, professional prestige, and
reputation.
57
D. Post-Cardozo Administration
The Commissioner followed I.T. 4044, Hill, and Cardozo with
a narrow and rigid audit policy. Unless a teacher (or other employed
individual) could prove that an educational expense had been incurred
under employer compulsion, it was not "necessary," was incurred for
enhancement (professional or cultural), and was disallowed as "per-
sonal." The patent discrimination between the self-employed and the
employed was ignored. Although a self-employed individual was
ordinarily trusted to judge what was helpful and appropriate to his
business, and his discretionary, business-related expenses were de-
ductible, the only safeguard deemed sufficient to the protection of the
public fisc in the case of an employed person was the compelling man-
date of his employer.' This view was to last even longer in practice
than it did as avowed government policy.59
r- It would seem that if research is to be broadly categorized as "education," it
is at least relevant to ask whose education. If the research is to educate the taxpayer,
problems of capitalization and, perhaps, of the personal expense are present; but if
it is to educate others, the professor, as in Davis (and perhaps in Cardozo), is just
doing his job. See notes 62-63 infra and accompanying text.
56 In 1921 the Commissioner presumed, through the application of a rule of strict
necessity, to judge whether an ambassador's entertainment activity was "necessary" to
his work. Because Congress does "not require it as one of the duties of the position
[his] . . . expenditures are personal . . . and not business . . . ." O.D. 1020,
5 Cum. BULL. 172 (1921). The principle and reasoning underlying Rev. Rul. 63-275,
1963 INT. Rxv. BULL. No. 52, at 13, justify revocation of O.D. 1020, if it has not
passed into oblivion as a result of its own weightlessness.
57 Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), viewed these as elements of a capital
expenditure, as did James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944), note 54 supra. See note
30 supra.
58 The case frequently cited to indicate the liberality afforded corporations in the
deductibility of their executives' expenses is Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 25 T.C.
463 (1955), acq., 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 8 (expenses of sending officers on African game
hunt deductible). The self-employed lawyer may deduct the cost of keeping current
on developments in the tax field, Coughlin v. Commissioner, 203 F.2d 307 (2d Cir.
1953), reversing 18 T.C. 528 (1952), he alone judging necessity.
For some of the history of the post-Hill-Cardozo-I.T. 4044 period, see Loring,
supra note 11, at 153-57; Maguire, Individual Federal Income Tax in 1950, 35 AMEmi-
CAN A. UNIvERSITY PROFESSORS BULL. 748 (1953); 44 A.B.A.J 1097 (1958); 58
COLUm. L. Rxv. 1097 (1958).
59 See Loring, IRS Denying Educational Expense That Would Be Ordinary and
Necessary for Business, 9 J. TAxATiON 280 (1958).
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IV. THE 1958 REGULATIONS
In 1958 the Treasury promulgated regulations codifying the rule
of the Alexander Silverman case," holding that convention travel
expenses are deductible if reasonably related to a taxpayer's business,
and concluding that,
No distinction will be made between self-employed persons
and employees. . . . The allowance of deductions for such
expenses will depend upon whether there is a sufficient rela-
tionship between the taxpayer's trade or business and his
attendance at the convention or other meeting so that he is
benefiting or advancing the interests of his trade or business
81
At the same time, regulations 62 were issued to lift the rule of
strict necessity in the case of educational expenses. Expenditures "for
education (including research activities)" were said to be deductible
if undertaken either for "maintaining or improving skills" which the
taxpayer requires "in his employment or other trade or business" or
for meeting a requirement of his employer. And educational expenses
are of the "maintaining or improving skills" variety where "it is
customary for other established members of the taxpayer's trade or
business to undertake such education . ... "3
The educational expense regulations were followed with Revenue
Ruling 60-97 " in which the Commissioner sought to explain their
60Alexander Silverman, 6 B.T.A. 1328 (1927).
61 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d) (1958). (Emphasis added.)
62 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958).
63The regulations under the 1939 Code, Treas. Reg. 118, §39.23(a)-15(f)
(1953), listed "expenses of taking special courses or training" among its nondeduc-
tible items. As originally proposed in 1956, the 1954 Code Regulations would have
permitted an employed individual a deduction for educational expense only if his
employer required him to undertake the study. Proposed Treas. Reg. §1.162-5(d),
21 Fed. Reg. 5093 (1956). The less restrictive approach of the final version is believed
to have resulted largely from pressures brought by educational interests and the
United States Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.
Although the regulations under §.212 (nonbusiness expenses for income pro-
duction) make general reference to the regulations under § 162 (presumably intending
§ 1.162-5), they continue to disallow "expenses of taking special courses of training"
and "expenses paid or incurred in securing admission to the bar, and corresponding
fees and expenses paid or incurred by physicians, dentists, accountants, and other
taxpayers for securing the right to practice their respective professions." Treas.
Reg. § 1.212-1(f) (1957).
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 was adopted on April 3, 1958. To permit a taxpayer to
take advantage of the provisions as far back as 1954 for which the statute of limita-
tions would ordinarily bar refund claims after April 15, 1958, Congress enacted special
legislation permitting such claims to be filed up to November 3, 1958. Technical
Amendment Act § 96, 72 Stat. 1672 (1958), 26 U.S.C. § 6511, note at 4820 (1958).
See Devereaux v. Commissioner, 292 F.2d 637, 639 (3d Cir. 1961).
The regulation's parenthetical inclusion of "research activities" under "education"
fails to make relevant and significant distinctions. See note 55 supra.
6 1960-1 Cum. BULL. 69.
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impact, particularly on the teaching profession. He stated explicitly
that no distinction would be drawn between an employed person and
one self-employed. The view that deductibility is dependent upon
employer-compulsion was eliminated. 5 Customariness, not legal ob-
ligation, was made the test.0
Revenue Ruling 60-97 and the regulations, both as to travel and
educational expenses, are interpretive of section 162(a), establishing
criteria for the "ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred . . .
in carrying on any trade or business . . . . " They pin deductibility
on the relationship of the expense item to the taxpayer's business-
its appropriateness and helpfulness Oaand on its customariness.
Absence of the business relationship would seem to connote a personal
expense; given the business nexus, however, the absence of customari-
65 The elimination of any distinction between the employed and self-employed is
stated as to travel expenses in Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d) (1958). See text accompanying
note 61 supra. Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 69, emphasized that Treas. Reg.
§ 1.162-5 (1958), has the same effect as to educational costs. See also speech by
Virginia Wraase, Tax Rulings Division, Internal Revenue Service, National Edu-
cation Association Convention, July 2, 1958.
66The weight placed upon customariness has been questioned previously. See
notes 34, 43 supra. In J. S. Watson, 31 T.C. 1014 (1959), nnacq., 1963-1 Cum.
BuLL. 5, an internist practicing "psychosomatic medicine" was allowed the expenses
incurred in undergoing psychoanalysis against the objection that it was not customary
and so not ordinary for a physician to take the training (education) provided by
psychoanalysis. The court said the absence of customariness was not fatal since the
taxpayer's purpose was to maintain or improve his skills, and this, not whether others
did so, was controlling. Although the Commissioner relied for his position on Treas.
Reg. § 1.162-5(a) (1) (1958), the court found support for the taxpayer in example 2
of Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(e) (1958).
Psychiatrists have been denied deductions under the 1958 regulations for the costs
of their psychoanalysis and tuition at a psychoanalytic institute where the purpose was
to enable them to qualify as psychoanalysts. Namrow v. Commissioner, 288 F.2d 648
(4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 914 (1961) ; Grant Gilmore, 38 T.C. 765 (1962).
In both Namrow and Gilmore the "educational" expenses were regarded presumably as
capital because undertaken "to meet the minimum requirements for qualification [in a]
. . . specialty . . . ." Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5(b) (1958). But the regulations continue
to fudge the ground for disallowance, lumping minimum requirements with "other
personal purposes of the taxpayer." Until there is sharper demarcation and some
basis provided for recovery of such substantial intangible capital costs as were involved
in Namrow and Gilnore, injustice will persist and litigation will continue. See notes
16-17 supra and accompanying text; notes 43 supra, 92 infra.
The expenses of securing a legal education have been held deductible where
helpful in taxpayer's current occupation as an accountant, Walter T. Charlton, 23
CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 420 (1964), but not where the objective was to gain livelihood
as a lawyer, Sandt v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 111 (3d Cir. 1962). The number of
cases involving the deductibility of the expenses of a legal education are growing and
they divide on a Watson-Namrow factual line, providing either full current deducti-
bility or none. Compare United States v. Welsh, 329 F.2d 145 (6th Cir. 1964) (costs
allowed), with Condit v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 153 (6th Cir. 1964) (costs dis-
allowed). The courts have divided on a somewhat similar line where the costs were
incurred to secure nonlegal graduate degrees. Compare Devereaux v. Commissioner,
292 F.2d 637 (3d Cir. 1961), and Marlor v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 615 (2d Cir.
1958) (costs allowed), with Albert R. Killips, 22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 845 (1963)
(costs disallowed).
Oa The "regulations in effect recognize the principle that the term 'necessary' as
used in section 162 is broad enough to cover expenditures voluntarily made which are
'appropriate and helpful.'" Cosimo A. Carlucci, 37 T.C. 695, 699 (1962). See Rev.
Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. BuLL. 69, 70.
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ness or an employer-requirement would appear to denote a capital
expenditure, but the employer-requirement is an alternative test only.
Although research activities should have been treated separately, with
recognition of the fact that research may be either part of one's
educational program or a function of one's job, they were not.67
Nevertheless, the regulations and Revenue Ruling 60-97 could have led
to an intelligent administration of the law, free of discrimination
against the employed individual. But they did not. 8
V. THE DAvIS CASE
In Davis 9 the Tax Court ignored the 1958 Regulations and
Revenue Ruling 60-97. Disallowance was sustained because the pro-
fessor's expenses were not "necessary." The evidence showed that
Professor Davis had academic tenure, a status which made dismissal
or salary reduction, permissible only for "adequate cause"; failure to
engage in research would not constitute such cause. Pomona College
required neither that Davis engage in his research project nor that
he complete it once begun. The evidence did indicate, however, that
research and publication were expected generally of the Pomona
faculty and that members of the faculty customarily engaged in re-
search. But the conferring of tenure and the absence of an enforceable
obligation to do research were enough for the Tax Court to hold that
since the research was voluntary, not "necessary" to his continued
employment, the expenses were nondeductible. Then, emphasizing
testimony to the taxpayer's presumed detriment that his research might
increase his prestige as a scholar, the court cited Welch v. Helvering
and relied on the Cardozo case to bring its decision under the gen-
eralization that "expenditures made to acquire reputation and learning
are not ordinary and necessary business expenses." "
The dissenting opinion 71 of Judge Raum struck hard at the
majority's failure to isolate the issues. For the dissent, the first issue
67 See note 55 supra; notes 62-63 supra and accompanying text.
68 See Loring, supra note 59.6 9 Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962).
7 0 Id. at 179. The court said its finding that the taxpayer's purpose was to
"increase his prestige as a scholar" made it unnecessary to decide whether the cost
was deductible as an educational expense. Ibid. The voluntariness of the taxpayer's
conduct showed that the trip and research were not "necessary" and therefore
"personal."
The heavy precedential weight placed on Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951), is
strange. The controversy in that case involved only $229.03; the taxpayer was not
represented by counsel; the record is sparse; prestige and reputation as the taxpayer's
motive were suggested and accepted in cross-examination without the explanation
which would have been forthcoming on redirect if taxpayer had had counsel. Govern-
ment counsel in Cardozo was William M. Fay, who, as Judge of the Tax Court,
wrote for the majority in Davis. The Davis case was decided by a court split 8 to 6;
Judge Raum, who wrote the dissent, and not Judge Fay, was the hearing judge.
7138 T.C. at 180.
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was whether Davis's expenditures were incurred in carrying on his
trade or business, and Judge Raum both accepted and explained the
fact that research is of the essence of a professor's business. He re-
solved the second question, whether the expenditures were "necessary,"
by finding them helpful and bearing a direct relationship to the job
to be done. Except in the Cardozo case, he noted, compulsion had
never been the test, and he rejected it in Davis as unreasonable, dis-
criminatory vis-4-vis the self-employed, and contrary to precedent.72
A. Revenue Ruling 63-275
In my not-wholly-detached view7 the Commissioner and the
Department of Justice demonstrated a commendable concern for sound
tax policy and even-handed administration when they surrendered
their Tax Court victory in Davis and issued Revenue Ruling 63-275." 4
This ruling returns to the principles of G.C.M. 11654"7 and Welch
v. Helvering.78
Like the dissent in Davis, the ruling acknowledges the relationship
of the expenditure to the taxpayer's business to be the point of first
inquiry. If the relationship is direct, and if the expense is incurred to
help the taxpayer carry out his work, it is recognized as a business
expense, and not a personal one.
B. The Business of a Professor
The underlying question is the nature of the taxpayer's business,
and in the case of a professor it is seen to be twofold: to teach and to
72Id. at 185-86. Judge Raum. referred to Blackmer v. Commissioner, 70 F.2d
255 (2d Cir. 1934), for authoritative and longstanding acceptance of the fact that
"necessary" meant "appropriate" or "helpful" and not "indispensable" or "required";
he pointed to Waring Prods. Corp., 27 T.C. 921, 929 (1957), and Commissioner v.
Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177, 180-81 (1st Cir. 1953), for express rejection of a concept
of strict legal necessity. To him, the Tax Court's decision in Alexander Silverman,
6 B.T.A. 1328, acq., VI-2 Cum. BuLL. 6 (1927), should have controlled Davis.
73 My objectivity should be tested against my potential economic interest (I am
in the business) and my service as special counsel for the American Association of
University Professors in the Davis appeal and the negotiations which led to the issu-
ance of Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963 INT. REV. BuLL No. 52, at 13. See Oliver, stpra
note 7, at 15 n.6. Professors Ernest J. Brown and Clark Byse of the Harvard Law
School were with me on the association's amicus curiae brief to the Ninth Circuit.
74 Note 8 supra.
75 Note 25 supra.
78290 U.S. 111 (1933).
A subsidiary issue in Harold H. Davis, 38 T.C. 175 (1962), remanded, No. 18188,
9th Cir., Jan. 3, 1964, involved the deductibility of $290 a year for depreciation
(§ 167(a)) and the costs of use and upkeep (§ 162(a)) of a home study built and
used by Davis exclusively for preparation of his lectures, grading papers, storing
materials, student conferences and research. The Tax Court denied the deductions
because Pomona had provided Davis with a "cubicle" on campus and did not require
him to provide his own facilities. Seeing the home study only as a matter of "personal
1964] ,1105
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advance knowledge. Each of these may involve research. Since
research in his field of competence is therefore part of a professor's
work, expenses incurred to facilitate that research are business ex-
penses. "Employer-requirement" for a particular research project is
not part of the test. Implicit in Revenue Ruling 63-275 is an under-
standing of some of the realities of the academic environment out of
which the research expense and the tax question grow, and those
"realities" need to be stated.
Specific requirements by the professor's employer as to how or
when or where to go about the job of advancing knowledge, the
aspect of his function in which research plays its major role, are
likely to be self-defeating. The best research and writing are the result
of individual initiative, inner spark, and personal drive to contribute
and achieve recognition. If a professor fails to move in the direction
his interests indicate, if he fails to pursue his ideas to the point of
truth, he has failed in his job.
The university's appointment of a professor is an expression of
confidence and expectation that he will direct his capacities, his
energies, and his judgment and discretion to achieving excellence in
the performance of his work. In many instances the exercise of dis-
cretion may dictate a research expenditure.
convenience," the costs were not "necessary." 38 T.C. at 179-80. The dissent would
have allowed them on the same theory that it would have permitted the travel, i.e.,
the study was "helpful" to Davis in his work and "appropriate" to its performance.
The "convenience!' it provided was not, to Judge Raum and his dissenting colleagues,
"inconsistent with its proximate relationship to his work." 38 T.C. at 186-88.
Although this "home study" issue is not mentioned in Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963
INT. REv. BuLL. No. 52, at 13, the principle underlying the ruling controls it, and it,
too, was conceded by the Government in the Davis appeal. See Oliver, supra note 7,
at 16-17. The Tax Court has itself held contra to Davis on this issue (without
citing Davis) in Clarence Peiss, 40 T.C. 78 (1963), in an opinion by Judge Mulroney
(his position, if any, in Davis is unknown), to be compared with his earlier opinion
in Morris S. Schwartz, 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 725 (1961).
Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 CuM. BULL. 52, purports "to furnish guidelines for de-
termining the amount of the deduction to which an individual is entitled for the
ordinary and necessary expenses attributable to the portion of his personal residence
which he uses in the performance of his duties as an employee." It is less than clear
in its concept of "duties as an employee." It may be read restrictively to permit a
deduction only where the employer requires the employee to use his own facilities,
a position contra to Peiss, the dissent in Davis, and the principle underlying Rev. Rul.
63-275, or it may be read consistently with these authorities to allow the deduction
where the facility has a reasonable relationship to the employee's work and the require-
ments of the work, as determined reasonably by the employee, call for the facility.
Cf. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVIcE, U.S. TREASURY DEP'T, Doc. No. 5014, EMPLOYEES'
EXPENSES-EDUcATIONAL ExPENSES 2-3 (Dec. 1963). See also Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1
CuM. BULL. 69. Rev. Rul. 62-180 should be clarified with an unequivocal statement
in bar of any inference that the "employer-requirement" test persists. See note 96
infra. Whatever evidentiary safeguards may be necessary should be enunciated to
restrict the potential for abuse and deception present whenever a business facility is
carved out of or tacked onto a personal residence. See note 78 infra. For the self-
employed's recognized right to recover costs in connection with a home study, see,
e.g., Beaudry v. Commissioner, 150 F.2d 20 (2d Cir. 1945).
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C. Factfinding
It is often difficult to isolate the expenditure for consumption
-for pleasure or social diversion-from the business expense, espe-
cially when it involves travel to lands which beckon the vacationer and
researcher alike.77  Indeed, in many cases the purpose of the expendi-
ture may be mixed. But factfinding and linedrawing are required in
the case of the entrepreneur, and they are no more difficult in the case
of the employed individual."8 The merit in the "employer-requirement"
test was the relief it might provide from the unsure task of line-
drawing in a substantial number of cases. But the discrimination
vis-A-vis the self-employed that is inherent in such a test would be
rank in the case of a professor whose work requires that there be no
"employer-requirement," and it is not justified by the lighter burden
it would provide for court and Commissioner.79
D. Academic Tenure
Revenue Ruling 63-275 not only rejects "employer-requirement"
as the necessary condition of deductibility, but neutralizes the effect
77 See, e.g., Dennehy v. Commissioner, 309 F.2d 149 (6th Cir. 1962), where a
mathematics professor appears to have gone on a personal jaunt, and the court properly
disallowed the expenses of the trip to which he had urged a teaching relationship.
Cf. Cross v. United States, 63-2 U.S. Tax Cases 1 9762 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), appeal filed,
7 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAx. REP. (U.S. Tax Cas.) 70753 (2d Cir. 1964) (an
assistant professor of romance languages was allowed costs of a European trip which
he thought necessary to maintain and improve skills in his field) ; Rev. Rul. 64-176,
1964 INT. REv. BuLl. No. 23, at 7; Note 88 infra.
78 Since enactment of the Revenue Act of 1962, the deduction for meals and
lodging away from home has been limited to amounts not "lavish or extravagant
under the circumstances." Section 162(a) (2). The "abuse" cases which led to this
provision were among the self-employed and the corporate expense-account jockeys,
not the professor or the lower-level corporate employee spending his own money.
Strict accounting for expenses is called for by § 274(d), and rules for allocating travel
expense between the personal and the business portion of a trip are set forth in
§274(c), both added by the Revenue Act of 1962, with §274(c) liberalized by
§ 217(a) of the Revenue Act of 1964.
79As Mr. Justice Holmes said in a discussion of "line-drawing" in another
context, "the constant business of the law is to draw such lines." Dominion Hotel,
Inc. v. Arizona, 249 U.S. 265, 269 (1919). And this is not to suggest drawing lines
"simply for the sake of drawing lines." Pearce v. Commissioner, 315 U.S. 543, 558
(1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
A professor is an "employee" in form only. As Judge Charles E. Wyzanski
stated to his board while President of the Board of Overseers of Harvard University:
A University is the historical consequence of the mediaeval studium generale
-a self-generated guild of students or of masters accepting as grounds for
entrance and dismissal only criteria relevant to the performance of scholarly
duties. The men who become full members of the faculty are not in substance
our employees. They are not our agents. They are not our representatives.
They are a fellowship of independent scholars answerable to us only for
academic integrity.
Wyzanski, Sentinels and Stewards, HARVA D ALUMNI BULL. 316 (Jan. 23, 1954).
See also SNow, THE MASTERS 371-87 (1951) (App.: Reflections on the College Past).
In a community of scholars which operated without a university corporate-
employer superstructure, professors might not be "employees"; they are in our society,
however, because it is most convenient and workable. Would it not then be ironic
if the evolution of a form found conducive to a professor's performance should result
in the disallowance as "personal" of expenses brought on by his work?
1964]
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of academic tenure." Tenure had provided the Tax Court majority
in Davis with its affirmative basis for concluding that the professor's
research expenses were "personal." It regarded tenure as incon-
sistent with an obligation to do research, and for an employed indi-
vidual only obligatory expenses were "necessary."
Under the ruling, a professor "with or without tenure" may
deduct the expenses he incurs in areas of his professional competence.
This recognizes that tenure is not a license for indolence and leisure
as the Davis opinion implies.8 ' It is rather an institution developed
to enable those who have demonstrated their responsibility and com-
petence to carry on their work and perhaps achieve new levels of
performance, enhanced by a freedom of spirit that results from the
knowledge that their status and economic security will not be terminated
on arbitrary or discriminatory grounds."
The principal justification for academic tenure is that it
enables a faculty member to teach, study, and act free from
a large number of restraints and pressures which otherwise
would inhibit independent thought and action.
... . This deserves emphasis: Academic freedom and
tenure do not exist because of a peculiar solicitude for the
human beings who staff our academic institutions. They
exist, instead, in order that society may have the benefit of
honest judgment and independent criticism which otherwise
might be withheld because of fear of offending a dominant
social group or transient social attitude.
80 See note 9 supra.
The most generally accepted and widely adopted statement of principles of an
academic tenure is that adopted by the American Association of University Professors
and the Association of American Colleges in 1940 (the "1940 Statement of Prin-
ciples"). 49 AMERICAN A. UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS BULL. 192-93 (1963).
81 Professor Boris I. Bittker states that Davis was decided on the "theory that
a professor with lifetime tenure has it made and can relax." BITTEER, FEDERAL
INCOME ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION (2d ed. Supp. 1963, at 52).
82 As the testimony in the Davis case put it, the conferring of tenure is an "act
of faith." Record, p. 68, Davis v. Commissioner, No. 18188, 9th Cir., Jan. 3, 1964.
In this singular act the university recognizes responsibility and declares its continued
expectation of performance.
83 BYSE & JOUGHIN, TENURE IN AMERICAN HIGHER EDUCATION: PLANS, PRAC-
TICES AND THE LAW 2, 4 (1959). The purpose and function of tenure has also been
stated succinctly in REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON LAW SCHOOL ADMINISTRA-
TION AND UNIVERSITY RELATIONS OF THE AssOCrATION OF AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS,
ANATOMY OF MODERN LEGAL EDUCATION 205-06 (1961):
Unless a school of higher learning can assure its faculty members a free
and independent environment in which to carry on their work, it cannot
satisfactorily perform its function in society as purveyor of existing knowl-
edge, critic of our current institutions, seeker of new truths, and leader in the
search for social progress. The existence of such an environment depends
in the first instance upon adequate procedures for tenure and termination.
(Emphasis added.)
According to the 1940 Statement of Principles, supra note 80, once tenure is
attained, dismissal or reduction in salary is permissible only for "adequate cause."
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Tenure then is the technique of the academic world for creating
and safeguarding an environment most congenial to research and
teaching. The Commissioner's abandonment of the Tax Court's
view that tenure negates the business nexus for a professor's research
expenses dispels the paradox which is inherent in that view.
VI. IN FUTURO
A. The System
One could devise a net income tax system which allowed only
those expenses incurred specifically to generate income or, more
pristinely, only those traceable to income thereby generated. But that
is not our system. It is too rigid and could unwisely counter prideful
impulses for innovation and experiment.
Our system allows expenses incurred in carrying on one's busi-
ness. The expenses and income of taxpayers will differ as will the
measure and method of their performance, although the degree of
difference is not likely to vary proportionately. In some areas of
endeavor like university teaching and research, income tends to be
relatively stable and predetermined, based on prior performance and
future expectation. A professor working within such an institu-
tional pattern ought not be ruled maverick, beyond the pale of the
net income system, when his measure of performance demands ex-
cellence and his method, though self-determined, requires expenditure.
To disallow his research expense is to classify it "consumption." Our
tax system does not call for this result; a reasonably enlightened social
and educational policy condemns it.
B. The "Business" of a Taxpayer
With Revenue Ruling 63-275 on the books, one hopes I have
been beating a dead horse. History indicates, however, that this
horse has a marked feline bent for resurrection. Several days after the
ruling was published (and presumably without knowledge of it) the
Tax Court decided Corliss Lamont,'M disallowing expenses incurred
by a freewheeling "author, writer, teacher, and lecturer." The ground
of decision was the avocational nature of the taxpayer's activities, not
"[T]he essential characteristic of tenure . . . is continuity of service, in that the
institution in which the teacher serves has in some manner-either as a legal obligation
or as a moral commitment-relinquished the freedom or power it otherwise would
possess to terminate the teacher's services." BYsE & JouGHiN, op. cit. supra at 2.
"Adequate cause" usually includes professional incompetence and immorality. Id.
at 45-46, 69.
8423 CCH Tax Ct Mem. 3 (1964), appeal filed, 7 CCH 1964 STAND. FED. TAx
REP. (U.S. Tax Cas.) 70725 (2d Cir. 1964).
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the absence of "necessity" as in Davis. Although it appears that
the bulk of Lamont's time was spent in writing and lecturing, with
some part-time teaching at universities, his investments and not these
activities were his source of income. On the record, therefore, the
court may well have been justified in finding that the taxpayer's ex-
penses, which he deducted from his very substantial investment income,
were not incurred in carrying on a business."' Because the taxpayer's
teaching, lecturing, and writing activities were not "engendered by the
motive or intent of realizing profits," his activities did not constitute a
business, and therefore the expenses of those activities were not
deductible.
The language of the Lamont opinion is careful, but a wary
vigilance will be needed to avoid its leading to less care."6 The ex-
penses were not disallowed merely because they were not incurred
to make money, but because they were not incurred in the taxpayer's
business. The holding and court's reasoning, therefore, should not
result in disallowance in the case of one who is in the business of
researching or writing (be he professor or free lance) because the
particular expenses are not traceable to additional income or because
they are unnecessary in the sense that they were not compelled.
In maintaining an administrable line between Professor Davis
and Mr. Lamont, as I propose, the Commissioner and the courts must
inquire as to the nature of the work in which the taxpayer earns his
income-his "business." They must learn not only the minimum re-
quirements for receipt of the income, but the function which the
taxpayer is expected to perform. In the case of a professor the
academic community expects research; the broader community de-
pends upon it. If the taxpayer is "in business," he is on the Davis,
and not the Lamont, side of the line.
C. The Necessary Expense
When the scope and function of the taxpayer's business are under-
stood, a second inquiry must be made, one to determine whether the
85 Nor were they incurred in a nonbusiness, but nevertheless income-producing,
activity which would have justified a deduction under §212(1). Expenses allocable
to occasional honoraria or lecture fees would be deductible under § 212(1).
86 1 assume that the court in Lamont did not mean that a taxpayer's activities are
not "business" activities whenever motivated in part by the "personal satisfaction of
obtaining and holding the respect of others recognized as qualified in those fields,"
23 CCII Tax Ct. Mem. at 7, but that a "business" also "necessitates a substantial
profit motivation on the part of the person who is conducting an activity." Ibid.
See Doggett v. Burnet, 65 F.2d 191 (D.C. Cir. 1933). The counterinference would
restore shades of Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3 (1951), and the undue emphasis it
placed on prestige and reputation as evidence of "personal" activity. Cf. Brooks v.
Commissioner, 274 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1959) ; Cornelius Vanderbilt, Jr., 16 CCH Tax
Ct. Mem. 1081 (1957); James M. Osborn, 3 T.C. 603 (1944) (where expenses of
one's seeking to create a reputation to break into teaching were held capital).
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taxpayer incurred the expense at issue in furtherance of his business.
The answer depends upon whether the expense bore a direct relation-
ship to the execution of the taxpayer's business task, self-assigned or
not, and whether it was thought helpful and appropriate to that end. An
affirmative conclusion should satisfy the statutory test for the "neces-
sary" expense.' However, an activity very slightly related to the
taxpayer's work and having the attributes of consumption, though not
wholly devoid of business context, may be nondeductible as not
"necessary." This result is anticipated only where, despite a suffi-
cient business nexus to prevent characterization of the expense as
entirely "personal," (1) the evidence does not provide a rational or
workable basis for allocating the expense between its personal and
business aspects, and (2) it adds little to the taxpayer's ability to
perform.m
D. The "'Ordinary" Expense
If the results of both inquiries indicate the expenditure was
business-related, not part of a hobby or personal lark, a third inquiry is
called for, one which will distinguish the expense incurred in "carrying
on" a business from the capital investment. It will distinguish the
research expenses of a practicing professor from those of a hopeful
who seeks to enter the ranks but has not yet done so.8' In a word it
87The administrative and judicial attempt to disallow illegal expenses and those
which are against public policy, a venture of doubtful merit at best, demonstrates an
inherent weakness when it pins disallowance on the theory that such expenses are not
"necessary." See Note, Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some
Problents of Sanctioning With the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108 (1962) ;
But cf. United Draperies, Inc., 41 T.C. 457 (1964) (taxpayer's rebates to cus-
tomer's employees not deductible; Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine
That Deductions Should Be Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace,
56 HARv. L. Ruv. 1142, 1145 (1943). And surely the disallowance of a rental deduc-
tion in a sale and lease-back transaction between taxpayer and himself, as trustee for
his children, does not hinge on a conclusion that the rent was not "necessary" if the
transaction is "in reality a camouflaged assignment of income." I. L. Van Zandt,
40 T.C. 824, 830 (1963). See note 97 infra.
88 Where possible, an allocation should be made.
An individual is . . . regarded for tax purposes as having two person-
alities: one is a seeker after profit who can deduct the expenses incurred in
that search; the other is a creature satisfying his needs as a human and those
of his family but who cannot deduct such consumption and related expendi-
tures. But since the individual remains one individual, where is that dividing
line? Moreover, is it an absolute line in the sense that an expenditure be-
longs entirely to one or the other of the personalities, or may an expenditure
be allocated between them?
Suammy & WARREN, FEDERAL INcOM TAXATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 272 (1960).
For evidentiary safeguards where allocation is appropriate, see note 78 supra.
89 See note 54 supra. Compare Leonard A. Peto, 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 139,
aff'd per curiam, 262 F.2d 342 (2d Cir. 1958) (deduction of expenditures to gain
employment through promotion of business ventures denied), with Paul H. Pazery,
22 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1814 (1963) (expenses of trip to Europe in connection with
proposed but never consummated transaction deductible). In Kaufman v. United
States, 64-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 119397 (E.D. Pa. 1964), the costs incurred by a disbarred
1112 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.112:1089
determines whether the expense is "ordinary." This determination
must be made because the statute requires that the operating expense
be distinguished from the capital. However, the history of the con-
fusion of which this is the tale makes clear that the statutory test of
the "ordinary" is helpful and meaningful only when limited to drawing
that distinction.' This essentially is the teaching of Welch v. Helver-
ing: that "ordinary" is the obverse of capital, not personal.
In the case of a professor, academic research is part of his
business. His research expenses are "ordinary" when, as in the
usual case, they are not directed to the production of a specific, income-
producing asset. Only research directed to the creation of a com-
mercially marketable book or a saleable product or process requires
capitalization of the expenses, these to be recovered over the period of
income production."'
Although today disallowance is the probable consequence for both
the personal expense and the outlay producing an intangible capital
asset of "indeterminable" useful life (such as most professional educa-
tion), it is imperative to differentiate between them. The distinction
should help avoid the compounding of error which led to Davis, and
someday the cost of an intangible capital asset such as business-related
education may be recoverable. 2
VII. CONCLUSION
The Tax Court and Commissioner have not been analytical in
their gross conception and tax treatment of education. They have too
rarely differentiated between the capital educational expenditure and
the personal. They have been unmindful of Justice Cardozo's analysis
in Welch v. Helvering which suggested that some types of education
may be business-related, and that when the purpose of such education is
to get started in business, the cost must be capitalized. In disallowing
lawyer in securing his reinstatement were held nondeductible, relying on McDonald v.
Commissioner, 323 U.S. 57 (1944), Shoyer v. United States, 290 F.2d 817 (3d Cir.
1961), and Henry G. Owen, 23 T.C. 377 (1954), for doctrine denying current recovery
of costs of prospective business. See Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1 (f) (1957). See also Frank
B. Polachek, 22 T.C. 858 (1954) ; Morton Frank, 20 T.C. 511 (1953).
90 See Griswold, An Argument Against the Doctrine That Deductions Should Be
Narrowly Construed as a Matter of Legislative Grace, 56 HARv. L. REv. 1142 (1943).
9' See Rev. Rul. 63-275, 1963 INT. REV. BuLL. No. 52, at 13; note 9 supra.
92 See text accompanying note 17 supra; notes 43, 66 supra; cf. note 54 supra.
An effort directed to taxing no more than net income should produce a practical method
for recovery of educational costs incurred in a business context. See BOtLDING, THE
EcoNoiIcs OF PEAcE 83 (1946); VICKERY, AGENDA FOR PRaoREssIvE TAXATION
123-24 (1947); Goode, Educational Expenditures and the Income Tax, in EcoNoMIcs
OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1962); Musgrave, Growth with Equity, 53 Am. EcoN. REv.
323, 329 (1963) ; Shaw, Education as an Ordinary and Necessary Expense in Carry-
ing on a Trade or Business, 19 TAx L. REv. 1, 29-30 (1963).
The need for attention to the problem of recovering the cost of intangibles of a
presumed indeterminable life is not limited to education and did not originate there.
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educational costs, including those which are business-related, they have
generally done so by calling them "personal," " but have nevertheless
cited Welch v. Helvering as authority. The expenses of scholarly re-
search, caught up in the broad category of "education," ' have been
victim to this opaqueness. Having determined the tax consequences
of expenses falling in that category, the Tax Court and Commissioner
disallowed the costs of research as "personal." No attention was paid
to the object of the research or its beneficiary; no factual inquiry was
made to determine whether the research was part of the education of
the researcher (enabling him to undertake or carry on his work), or
was part of the job which the researcher was employed to perform,
with the results of the research intended largely for others.9"
In striving to find specific statutory warrant for the uncritical
treatment which had been afforded education, the Tax Court placed
extraordinary emphasis on the word "ordinary," finding, as in its
opinion in Hill, that summer school expenses were nondeductible as
"personal" because the taxpayer had not proved that it was "ordinary"
for school teachers to take summer courses. When appellate dis-
agreement was voiced on the ground that an employer-requirement of
summer school work or a stated alternative was a sufficient basis for
deduction, the Commissioner and Tax Court thereafter concluded
that the commonness of that expense might in some cases be accepted
without specific proof, thus satisfying their view of "ordinary;" but
they then also concluded that an employer-requirement was pre-
requisite to deduction. In the absence of such a requirement the ex-
pense was not "necessary." This interpretation of the statute created
an unjustified distinction between the self-employed individual, whose
judgment as to the business wisdom of an expense was normally ac-
cepted, and the employee, whose employer's judgment was required,
although it was the employee's money that had been spent. The
Davis case grew out of this "logic."
See Treas. Reg. § 1.167(a)-3 (1960). The Tax Court appears to be making a
beginning: Compare Indiana Broadcasting Corp., 41 T.C. No. 76 (March 13, 1964),
and KWTX Broadcasting Co., 31 T.C. 952, aff'd per curiatm, 272 F2d 406 (5th Cir.
1959), with WDEF Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 215 F. Supp. 818 (E.D. Tenn.
1963), and Rev. Rul. 56-520, 1956-2 Cum. Bn.L. 170, and T.I.R. 556 (March 20, 1964).
9 3 .See, e.g., I.T. 4044, 1951-1 Cu . BuLL.. 16, notes 44-47 SuPra and accompanying
text, disallowing as "personal" the expenses incurred for "obtaining a teaching posi-
tion, a higher position [and] an advance in the salary schedule" as well as to "fulfill
• . . general cultural aspirations . . . ." And in Manoel Cardozo, 17 T.C. 3, 4
(1951), expenses were disallowed as "personal" where incurred to "increase . . .
prestige, improve . . . reputation for scholarship and learning . . . and to better
fit [the taxpayer] to perform the duties for which he was employed."
94 The 1958 Regulations, e.g., cover "education (including research activities)."
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-5 (1958) ; see text accompanying notes 62-63 supra.95Even writers who have criticized the Tax Court's decision and rationale in
Davis have uncritically accepted the education category for the expenses there involved.
See, e.g., Shaw, supra note 92, at 26; Note, 4 WML A AND MY L. REv. 55 (1963).
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If education had been treated critically, the costs of business-
related education would have been disallowed as a current expense in
those cases where they were of a capital nature; they would have been
allowed if, as the regulations now indicate appropriate, they served to
keep the taxpayer current. Had this occurred, research-even though
inaccurately categorized as education-might, in the case of a pro-
fessor, have been allowed as a current deduction. But surely recogni-
tion that a professor's research was part of his job, not his education,
would have led to allowance.
Of broader significance than the problems of the professor is the
body of precedent that built up misinterpreting the words "ordinary"
and "necessary." Once used as supposed statutory support for results
logically and factually indefensible, they took on an independence of
their own. The Commissioner and Tax Court assumed that current
business expenses would be nondeductible if they were not also
"ordinary and necessary," ignoring the fact that the only function to
which those words can make legitimate claim is in aiding the deter-
mination whether an expenditure is in furtherance of a business pursuit
and current. Failure so to limit the impact of those words has led to
unnecessary controversy, has frequently diverted inquiry from the
real point and even concealed it, and has subjected employed indi-
viduals to discriminatory tax treatment.96
Revenue Ruling 63-275 brings a new understanding to the prob-
lem-and without in any case requiring surrender to tax avoidance . 7
To preserve this perception and to avoid retracing the tortuous high-
toll route by which it was attained, "ordinary and necessary" must be
96 Despite the reversal by stipulation of the Davis case, some Tax Court judges
have not abandoned the rule of strict necessity in the case of employed individuals.
In Neil M. Kelly, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 472, 473 (1964), an airline pilot was denied
a deduction for allocable expenses of a home study used in part to store flight manuals
because it was not "necessary for him to have an office"; automobile expense for
travel between airports was denied as it was "neither ordinary nor necessary" although
an automobile is "faster and more convenient" than transportation provided by the
airline. In Valentine J. Anzalone, 23 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 497 (1964), a sales engineer
was denied allocable home-maintenance expenses, although the home was used for
business telephone conversations and preparation of reports, since the employer had
an available office and the home office was not required by the employer as a con-
dition of employment. The opinion in Ansalone was written by Judge Mulroney
whose position on this issue is unpredictable. See note 76 supra. If "employer-
requirement" is no longer the appropriate test, see, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.162-2(d)
(1958); Rev. Rul. 60-97, 1960-1 Cum. Bu.L. 69; cf. Rev. Rul. 62-180, 1962-2 Cum.
Bu". 52, the Commissioner should cease urging it, particularly where, as in Kelly
and Anzalone, the taxpayers appeared pro se. In Rev. Proc. 64-22, 1964 INT. Rrv.
Bul.. No. 22, at 74, the Internal Revenue Service admonished its personnel to
exercise care "not to raise an issue or to ask a court to adopt a position inconsistent
with an established Service position." Care was apparently not exercised in those
recent cases.
97 "Ordinary and necessary" has been the handy phrase on which the courts have
sometimes relied, or say they have, in disallowing "disguised dividends" paid by closely-
held corporations for the benefit of their shareholders and payments between related
taxpayers that would not have been made at arm's length. The words "ordinary and
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read in lower case. Such a reading will be facilitated if the courts
and Commissioner set as their goal the taxing of no more or less
than net income, employ the words "ordinary and necessary" only in
their limited capacity as aids to that end, and avoid prescribing an
independent substantive content for words that should have none.
necessary" are not needed, however, to disallow and treat as a dividend corporate
payment for the construction and upkeep of a boat which bore a direct relationship
to the shareholder's hobby but none to the corporation's business. American Proper-
ties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 262 F.2d 150 (9th Cir. 1958). Nor are they required to
disallow corporate payment of a shareholder's wedding expense, Haverhill Shoe
Novelty Co., 15 T.C. 517 (1950), or payments not in fact for the use of property,
despite the tag of "rent," Warren Brekke, 40 T.C. 789 (1963). "Examination of the
items is open to the Commissioner." Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319
U.S. 590, 596 (1943) (Jackson, J., dissenting). See Griswold, supra note 90.
As facile as the phrase is, "ordinary and necessary" was not up to the job of
disallowance (as acute factfinding might have been) when the costs of an African
safari were claimed. Sanitary Farms Dairy, Inc., 25 T.C. 463 (1955), acq., 1956-2
CuM. Buz. 8. Yet it has been said elsewhere that even an "ordinary and necessary"
expense is not deductible unless it is also "reasonable." Commissioner v. Lincoln
Elec. Co., 176 F.2d 815 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 949 (1950), on remand,
17 T.C. 1600 (1952).
Section 162(a) (1) ("reasonable allowance for salaries") has been thought to
provide special warrant for the disallowance as "unreasonable" of excessive salary
payments. But the fact is-and should be recognized and stated-that salary pay-
ments are disallowed when they are found to be for something other than services,
e.g., to cover a living or hobby expense of a shareholder-employee or just a "salary"
so much in excess of competitive requirements that it is recognized as a distribution
to a shareholder-employee of corporate earnings. Literal subservience to a presumed
requirement of "reasonableness" has led, however, to wholly unjustified disallowance
in an arm's-length employer-employee situation, Patton v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d
28 (6th Cir. 1948), and ignores legislative history. See Griswold, New Light on
"A Reasonable Allowance for Salaries," 59 HARv. L. Rxv. 286 (1945).
Today the concept of the "unreasonable," to test whether payments which purport
to be for services are so, is deeply imbedded and can be kept within bounds, but the
"ordinary and necessary" phrase has been mischievous. It should be discarded as a
substitute for explicit findings when payments are not what they are said to be.
Section 274, see note 78 mspra, should help defeat claims for expenses which are
essentially consumption, and sloppy records should no longer be a taxpayer boon.
